MD Supreme Court reverses order vacating summary judgment on Anne Arundel parcel - Maryland Daily Record (2024)

An Anne Arundel County landowner was entitled to summary judgment on his claim of adverse possession of a parcel of land in Venice Beach, the Maryland Supreme Court ruled last week.

In a 5-2 opinion with Justice Steven B. Gould writing for the majority, the Maryland Supreme Court held the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court abused its discretion in vacating a summary judgment order that awarded Charles Riley, Jr. and his company, Bay Pride, LLC, ownership of a land parcel and then entering judgment for Venice Beach Citizens Association, Inc. on that claim.

In reversing the Maryland Appellate Court’s judgment, the high court also held that the appeals court erred in conditionally reinstating the association’s counterclaim for a prescriptive easem*nt.

The case centers on the years-long litigation over a parcel of land in Venice Beach first divided in interest in 1977 among three individuals, of which Bay Pride and the association now each own interest in one portion of the parcel. However, the heirs of the remaining parcel interest — a 4,443 square foot undeveloped parcel of land bisected into unequal sections by a stone wall — are unknown.

According to the opinion, Riley and Bay Pride filed suit against the association in 2019, seeking declarations that Riley had acquired full legal title to both sections of the undeveloped parcel through adverse possession and quiet title, and asking the court to appoint a trustee to sell the undeveloped parcel in lieu of a partition among its joint tenant owners.

Venice Beach Citizens Association then countersued Riley and Bay Pride, claiming that the Venice Beach community residents used and maintained the disputed property, and requesting the court to declare the association had a prescriptive easem*nt benefitting the community residents.

Though the circuit court originally granted Riley’s summary judgment motion on the smaller section claim, a different judge at the bench trial vacated this order of summary judgment as to the smaller section and granted judgment against Riley on the claim.

The high court determined that the trial court abused its discretion, writing that for the summary judgment process “to work as intended, parties must be able to rely on partial summary judgments.”

“The trial court never explained why it was disregarding that order; it simply declared that it was not bound by it and did not ‘want to hear about’ it,” the majority wrote. “The result: prevailing on his summary judgment motion put Riley in a worse position than if he had never filed it. That’s not how the summary judgment process is supposed to work.”

Tucker Meneely, counsel for Riley, said he is pleased with the court’s decision.

“This case is especially important because there really was not a reported decision … that squarely addressed a trial court’s discretion to modify or vacate partial summary judgment orders,” Meneely said. “Because summary judgment is such a major aspect of civil litigation, I think having an opinion that addresses the partial summary judgment process is really going to be helpful to litigators in Maryland and provide guidance to courts in the future.”

Barbara Palmer, counsel for Venice Beach Citizens Association, said the Maryland Supreme Court “seemed more interested in the procedural issues that arose as a result of decisions made by the trial court, than what would be the correct decision in this case based upon Maryland law and the equities in play.”

“What was initially a somewhat complicated adverse possession matter, has become an opportunity for our Supreme Court to reassess the standards to be applied by the trial court when reviewing preliminary motions,” Palmer said, who noted her client’s agreement with the court’s dissenting justices.

Justice Michele D. Hotten wrote the dissenting opinion, which Justice Angela M. Eaves joined, finding the circuit court “did not abuse its considerable discretion” in vacating the summary judgment order.

“What Mr. Riley requests and the Majority holds is inapposite to our precedent,” Hotten wrote. “As recited by the Majority, the previous order granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Riley does not expressly limit the issues in a subsequent trial. … Thus, the order was within the broad revisionary reach of subsequent trial judges’ discretion.”

“The majority opinion limits the discretion of the trial judge when reviewing interlocutory orders, with little guidance for application in future cases,” Palmer said. “The Appellate Court, and those expressing their opinion in dissent, saw no reason to do this.”